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STRUCTURE ABSTRACT 
Purpose 
The aim of the article is to contrast the historical rise of the managerial function and its reception 
in law. It thus contributes to the debates on the separation of ownership and control, by showing that 
managers were never recognized in law. As a result, the managerial function was not protected in law. 
Design/methodology/approach 
We bring together management history and the history of UK company law to study the emergence 
of management in the early twentieth century and the lawÕs response. We bring new historical evidence 
to bear on the company law reforms of the second half of the twentieth century, and in particular, on 
the changes brought about by the Cohen Committee report of 1945. 
Findings 
Scientific progress and innovation were important rationales for the emergence of managerial authority. 
They implied new economic models, new competencies and wider social responsibilities. Our analysis 
shows that these rationales have been overlooked by company law. The lack of conceptualization of the 
management in law allowed reforms after 1945 that gave shareholders greater influence over corporate 
strategy, reducing managerial discretion and the scope for innovation.   
Research limitations 
Our study focuses on the UK. Further research is needed to confirm whether other countries 
followed a similar path, both in terms of the emergence of management, and in terms of the lawÕs 
approach.  
Originality/value 
This article is the first, to our knowledge, to examine the lawÕs historical approach to management. It 
calls for a reappraisal of the status of managers and the way corporate governance organizes the 
separation of ownership and control.   
 
Keywords: Ownership and control, management, company law, corporate governance, management 
history, directors. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since the seminal work of Berle & Means (Berle and Means, 1932; Mizruchi, 1983), the 
separation between ownership and control in business has been the subject of lively debate. 
There have been important discussions on when and how this separation took place in different 
countries (Coffee, 2001; Cheffins, 2001; Cheffins, 2008; Foreman-Peck and Hannah, 2015; 
Guinnane et al., 2007; Guinnane et al., 2017). But, whatever the process of this separation, the 
literature on corporate governance sees it as critical because it delineates the sphere of 
intervention of shareholders in the management of corporations. The separation of ownership 
and control therefore shapes the conditions for managerial discretion (Hambrick and 
Finkelstein, 1987; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990; Phillips et al., 2010; Wangrow et al., 2015). 
Different perspectives have been put forward. The economic literature has focused on the 
agency relationship between shareholders, who bear risks, and those who run companies. The 
general idea is that more accountability of ÒagentsÓ to their shareholder ÒprincipalsÓ is needed, 
either through supervision by the principals or through other mechanisms that align the interests 
of the two groups (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen 2001). The legal literature, however, insists 
that directors are not agents of the shareholders, and that the separation between shareholders 
and directors is legally grounded and economically sound because it supports specific 
investments from different constituencies (Blair, 1995; Blair and Kruse, 1999). The separation 
between ownership and control would thus favor a director primacy model, which is also seen 
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as a condition for stakeholder management (Johnson and Millon, 2005; Lipton and Rowe, 
2007). Dai & Helfrich (2016: p. 4) noted:  
ÒDespite the necessary tensions intrinsic in this relationship, there are substantial benefits 
to this separation as well, namely creating a more efficient capital market system in which 
investors are able to use their time to invest rather than govern, but more significantly, allowing 
corporations to be more than pure profit maximizers and simultaneously prioritize stakeholder 
interests and corporate social responsibility.Ó 
 Many authors, however, have observed that, in the Anglo-Saxon world, shareholders have 
significant influence on management (Zeitlin, 1974). This influence is all the more important 
with the rise of institutional investors in recent decades. It is also clearly not prevented by law, 
because directors can be legally removed by shareholders, with the latter given an exclusive 
and ultimate right of control in the UK and US at least (Kaufman and Englander, 2005; Millon, 
2013; Yosifon, 2014).  
In these debates on the legitimacy and reality of the separation between ownership and 
control, previous studies have extensively documented the positions of shareholders and 
directors (Franks et al., 2005; Foreman-Peck and Hannah, 2011; Hannah, 2007a; Guinnane et 
al., 2017; Hannah, 2007b). Few researchers, however, have examined the position of managers, 
and the separation between them and the board. Historically and practically, the function of 
management clearly separated from that of directors (Freeland, 2001; Wilson and Thomson, 
2006). The emergence of management as a distinctive Òsocial stratumÓ (Child, 1969, p.14) is 
evidenced by the rise of scientific management and debates about professionalisation around 
the turn of the twentieth century. As we show, it was recognized as a major breakthrough for 
industrial relationships and organizations by numerous commentators such as Fayol, Burton 
and, later, Berle. Whilst management science focused, appropriately enough, on the role of 
management and paid little attention to directors, the law did the reverse, concerning itself only 
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with directors. Even now, corporate law seems to suggest Òas patently is not the caseÑthat the 
institutional function and legal roles within the corporation [of officers and directors] are the 
sameÓ (Johnson and Millon, 2005, p.1601).  
The aim of our article is to shed light on the separation of ownership and control by 
documenting the historical emergence of the function of management and its reception by the 
law. In particular, it considers two questions. First, what were the fundamental roots of the 
separation between directors and managers, and second, how did the law deal with the 
emergence of this distinctive management function?  
Methodologically, our study draws on both management history and legal history. We make 
two methodological choices, and they entail important limitations. We presume that the claim 
of the paper that the rise of a distinctive managerial function in business companies was 
overlooked by law can apply quite broadly to Anglo-Saxon worlds, as well as to different 
Western European countries (some evidence is available from France (Fridenson, 1987), 
Belgium and Italy but would need further investigation). Typically, the literature usually 
considers that the models of corporate governance, whether shareholder primacy or director 
primacy, apply primarily, but not only, to the Anglo-Saxon world. However, there are obvious 
differences in the evolution and content of both management thought and legislation between 
countries. Therefore, to have consistent data, we focus on a single country. We chose to 
examine the evolution of law only in the United Kingdom on the basis that this country has 
shown itself to be among the most willing to make radical legal changes to the relationship 
between shareholders and directors. It has also exercised a significant influence on global 
corporate governance through its practice of issuing soft law codes that seek to increase the 
accountability of managers to shareholders.  
Our second methodological choice was not to study all the factors, sociological, political or 
financial, that drove the emergence of management, but rather to focus on the role of science 
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and innovation. At the end of the nineteenth century, as technological and scientific progress 
accelerated, the rise of science-based industry demanded a new role for management. Managers 
were needed not only to rationalize production and to reduce costs but also to devise innovative 
strategies and develop new organizational capabilities. Although limited, this focus on 
innovation allows us to identify some fundamental reasons for the distinction between the roles 
of directors and managers. 
Building on the business history literature, we first identify three main rationales for the 
separation of manager and director: i) in the new business model, the source of wealth 
generation shifted from ownership to administrative capability; ii) managerial authority was 
grounded on new techniques and competencies; and finally, iii) managerial authority entailed 
a new social responsibility to advance the interests not only of shareholders but also of the 
different constituencies.  
The case of the UK is, however, specific: the UK is known, historically, to have been 
reluctant to embrace managerialism, slow to introduce scientific management and to separate 
ownership and management (Wilson and Thomson, 2006). Part of this resistance may be 
attributed to ownership structure, as well as the organization of the engineering profession and 
the cultural dimension. Yet, recent works of business history on the UK as well as 
contemporaneous sources (textbooks, treatises and essays written on management in the early 
20th century) reveal that the rise of management was still clearly observable in the UK (Quail, 
2002). The fundamental rationales for the distinction between director and manager, although 
developing with a specific pace and intensity, were relevant in the UK. They motivated the 
emergence of new management functions, approaches and competencies, with particularly 
wide diffusion of Taylorian principles (Whitston, 1995). In essence, as Quail suggests, while 
the ownership structure was Òprophylactic to managerialismÓ in the UK, Òmanagerial capacityÓ 
nevertheless developed, combining new skills with changed power relations (Quail, 2002).   
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This situation contrasts with the approach taken in company law, which accommodated but 
did not provide positive support for these developments. We bring new historical evidence to 
bear on the company law reforms of the second half of the twentieth century, and in particular, 
on the changes brought about by the Cohen Committee report of 1945, which led to the 
introduction of a new Companies Act in 1948. These data show that the law ignored the 
fundamental rationales for the emergent distinction between directors and managers. We then 
argue that the absence of any positive legal conceptualization of management allowed a series 
of reforms after World War II that paved the way for an increased role of shareholders in 
corporate strategy and management.  
This article is the first, to our knowledge, to examine the lawÕs historical approach to 
management. The objective is not primarily to advance knowledge on the history of business 
in the UK. Instead, the aim is to contribute to the corporate governance literature on the 
separation of ownership and control. It also aims to stimulate further research at the crossroads 
of law and management to reappraise the status of managers and the implications of this for 
corporate governance.  
  
SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL VIEWS 
The separation of ownership and control is perhaps the most famous issue in corporate 
governance, first identified by Berle and Means (1932). At the end of the 1920s, these authors 
observed the rise of Òmodern corporationsÓ, giant and powerful business organizations where 
powers were allocated in new and puzzling ways. At that time, most Western countries had 
adopted limited liability and consolidated the law for public corporations (for example, the 
UKÕs Companies Act 1862 consolidated earlier Acts and gave full separate legal personality to 
joint stock companies). The new legal setting allowed massive fundraising and led to the 
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dilution or dispersion of ownership (Franks et al., 2005; Berle and Means, 1932). Those 
providing the funding did not necessarily control the business. In fact, the separation of 
ownership and control gave rise to two possible models of corporate governance, namely 
shareholder primacy and director primacy (Lipton and Rowe, 2007; Lan and Heracleous, 2010).  
This section reviews these different models of corporate governance and shows how the 
sphere of intervention of shareholders has largely been discussed in relation to directors, rather 
than managers. 
 
The armÕs length model of control and the model of shareholdersÕ primacy  
The first model, often labelled Òshareholder primacyÓ, is usually closely associated with 
the Anglo-Saxon system. This system is often characterized as an Òoutsider/armÕs-lengthÓ 
model: ÒoutsiderÓ because share ownership is dispersed rather than being concentrated in the 
hands of family owners, banks or affiliated firms; and ÒarmÕs-lengthÓ because investors in the 
US and the UK are rarely poised to intervene in running a business. Instead, they tend to 
maintain their distance and give executives a free hand to manage (Cheffins, 2001). 
In this system, the dominant theoretical framing views shareholders as mandating managers 
to run companies on their behalf, under the monitoring and control of the board of directors. 
This Òdelegation allows agents to opportunistically build their own utility at the expense of the 
principals' utility (wealth)Ó (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). This is why agency theory justifies 
empowering the board of directors to monitor and control managers (Fama and Jensen (1983, 
p. 311)1. As Òresidual claimantsÓ, shareholders get returns only when the firm makes a profit, 
                                               
1 Fama and Jensen consider that if shareholders and managers, then control rights and decision rights also 
need to be separated. Control rights are given to the board. They write: ÒSuch boards always have the power to 
hire, fire, and compensate the top-level decision managers and to ratify and monitor important decisions. Exercise 
of these top-level decision control rights by a group (the board) helps to ensure separation of decision management 
and control (that is, the absence of an entrepreneurial decision maker) even at the top of the organization.Ó (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983, p. 311).  
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i.e. when Òcontractually-prescribed amountsÓ have been paid to other stakeholders. 
Shareholders therefore have the greatest incentive to monitor executives, improving efficiency. 
There is also an argument that shareholders should be given exclusive ultimate control rights 
(Jensen, 2001) to ensure optimal control and avoid contradictory expectations (Tirole, 2001). 
Some authors go as far as suggesting that shareholders should be given more direct influence 
over business decisions, especially when these decisions frame the Òrules of the gameÓ (e.g. 
closing the company, scaling down, and distribution of profit) (Bebchuk, 2005). Under the 
agency perspective, therefore, as management separates from ownership, there is a need for 
more monitoring and control by directors on behalf of the shareholders.  
 
The view in law: the director primacy model 
Agency theory sees managers as the agents of shareholders, whereas the board is a body 
that is supposed to exercise control over the managers. But this interpretation has been strongly 
challenged by legal scholars (Lan and Heracleous, 2010). The most important challenge to date 
to the Ògrand design principalÐagent modelÓ of the corporation has come from Margaret Blair 
and Lynn Stout (Blair and Stout, 1999). They argued that corporate law in the United States 
separates the board of directors from the shareholders. But directors are neither agents of 
shareholders nor controllers. Instead, business corporations are seen as the locus of team 
production, intended to produce a Òcollective outputÓ, which is Òqualitatively different and 
vastly larger than the sum of what each individual could produce separatelyÓ (p. 264). Team 
production requires various parties to make contractually-unprotected firm-specific investment. 
It also requires mechanisms to reassure the parties that they will be protected against 
opportunism and rent-seeking by other team members (p. 251-2). 
This, in Blair and StoutÕs view, is precisely what the law provides by separating 
shareholders and directors. Protection of firm-specific investments comes in the form of a 
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neutral mediating hierarchy, Òwhose job is to coordinate the activities of the team members, 
allocate the resulting production and mediate disputes among team members over that 
allocationÓ. The board of directors is at the top of the hierarchy, and the key decision-making 
body2, with legally-protected independence from other team members, and Òan extraordinary 
degree of discretion to pursue other agendas and to favour other constituencies, especially 
management, at shareholdersÕ expenseÓ.  
This approach runs counter to agency theory as regards the role of the board, giving it the 
broader function of protecting the Òenterprise-specific investments of all the members of the 
corporate team, including shareholders, managers, rank and file employees, and possibly other 
groups, such as creditorsÓ (Blair and Stout, 1999, p.253). This vision of team production 
recognizes that a number of different groups make investments in the enterprise and bear risk, 
and therefore that a fair allocation of the results of collective production is required. Team 
production theory, unlike the economic theory of the firm, also gives an important place to the 
corporate legal entity as a means of committing resources to the enterprise.  
This model sees the separation of ownership and control as the separation between 
shareholders and the board of directors, with the latter being the key decision-making body of 
the corporation. This vision is, compared to agency theory, more accurate from a legal 
perspective.  
 
Company law and director primacy  
As Lan & Heracleous suggest, the director primacy model, Òmay be seen as more 
applicable and palatable to countries other than those in the Anglo-Saxon world, such as China, 
                                               
2 ÒThe board of directors is seen as a key decision-making body whose decisions on such matters as CEO 
appointment and compensation, response to takeover attempts, mergers and acquisitions, and shareholder 
dividends, as well as powers to review and control other major strategic decisions, provide a framework for the 
myriad decisions made by managers.Ó (Lan & Heracleous, 2010, p. 300).  
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Germany, Japan, and Russia, that are more stakeholder oriented and where shareholders are 
not always treated as primaryÓ (Lan & Heracleous, 2010, p. 310). Yet, the legal systems in the 
Anglo-Saxon world also support this view: basically, being a shareholder does not establish a 
right to participate in the management of the business (Lipton and Rowe, 2007).  
In the United Kingdom, company law clearly separated shareholders and directors from the 
Companies Act 1844 onwards (Ireland, 2010; Guinnane et al., 2017). At this stage, the directors 
always managed the business, and this was reflected in 1844 in a  statutory power to Òconduct 
and manage the Affairs of the CompanyÓ. Shareholders were explicitly excluded from 
management unless appointed as directors (Section 27 Joint Stock Companies Act 1844). 
Shareholders were later given limited liability, arguably making their position analogous to 
that of creditors.  
Several legal elements further solidified the separation between shareholders and directors. 
First, the early Companies Acts gave shareholders little or no power to remove directors, and 
few means of obtaining redress if they were dissatisfied, other than to sell their shares. It 
remained normal practice to require directors to hold significant quantities of shares, which 
ensured that they were responsive to shareholder interests, but directors were insulated from 
shareholder demands by a number of rules (Campbell and Turner, 2011). The 1844 Act gave 
shareholders no power to remove directors outside of a three-yearly retirement cycle, and from 
1862, the default rule was that directors could only be removed by special or extraordinary 
resolution, both of which required the support of 75% of those voting in person or by proxy 
(Guinnane et al., 2017). As the shareholders became increasingly dispersed, it became very 
difficult to achieve the necessary majority. Directors were also commonly entrenched through 
provisions in the articles. By default, boards were ÒstaggeredÓ with one third of the directors 
required to retire each year but available for re-election by the general meeting by simple 
majority. However, this offered little help to restive shareholders because, as a default rule, it 
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was avoided in a number of ways. Some companies made no provision for removal of directors 
whatsoever, which meant that the shareholders had to pass a special resolution to change the 
articles before they could vote on removal of directors. Before 1906, most companies made 
bespoke provision to designate one or more managing directors who were exempt from 
retirement by rotation (Parkinson, 1993, p.77).  
Second, between 1906 and 1935, the courts consistently prevented shareholder 
interference in the decisions of directors, offering a number of different justifications for this, 
ranging from protection of minority shareholders to the status of the company as a separate 
legal entity. Third, the courts relied on a strong presumption (known in the United States as the 
Òbusiness judgement ruleÓ) that directors were acting in good faith. In doing so, they gave 
directors a broad discretion to determine whether particular actions were for the benefit of the 
company (Parkinson, 1993, p.77), and made it very difficult for shareholders to use litigation 
to challenge directorsÕ decisions. The result of these rules was that individual directors were 
answerable to, and subject to the residual control of, the board of directors rather than the 
shareholders.  
The ongoing influence of shareholders and the impossibility of director primacy 
While company law supports a priori the director primacy model of corporate governance, 
the influence of shareholders on management has always been important in the Anglo-Saxon 
world (Zeitlin, 1974).  
Despite some legal insulating mechanisms, the real pressure for shareholder wealth 
maximization that undermines the prospects of the board acting as a mediating hierarchy comes 
from market rather than legal forces. Groups of shareholders can make exit threats which are 
far more credible than those made by employees who have made investments in firm-specific 
human capital (Millon 2000, p. 1028). Exit may result in a decline in the share price, and 
therefore the threat of hostile takeover, reduced bonuses for executive directors and senior 
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managers, shareholder activism, and, in the US, a proxy fight in which a shareholder seeks to 
install a new board.  
More generally, the board of directors is not sufficiently ÒinsulatedÓ from shareholder 
pressure (Gelter, 2009). As shareholders have considerable direct and indirect influence over 
directors, the mediating hierarchy role of the board has been compromised (Millon, 2000; 
Kaufman and Englander, 2005). This has been exacerbated by the growth of active institutional 
and alternative investors such as hedge funds, which demand short-term shareholder value 
maximization (Coffee and Palia, 2015). In particular, the law, both in the US and in the UK, 
gives shareholders great powers of influence over directors (Mayer, 2013; Greenfield, 2008; 
Greenwood, 2005). Directors can sometimes be forced or incentivized to give up social 
purposes to favor more profitable strategies (Haigh and Hoffman, 2014) or to pursue 
shareholder interests at the expense of the firm's long-term welfare (Lazonick, 2014), especially 
in takeovers or other changes of control (Page and Katz, 2010).  
To summarize, company law a priori supports the separation of ownership and control but 
in practice, this separation is not achieved since directors, who are supposed to run the company 
for the joint welfare of its constituencies, ultimately are accountable to shareholders. Once 
these factors are taken into account, the prospects of a mediating hierarchy look much weaker. 
However, in all these debates, the role and authority of managers, as opposed to directors, has 
been overlooked.  
 
THE RISE OF MANAGEMENT: NEW RATIONALES FOR SEPARATING 
DIRECTORS AND MANAGERS 
Few studies have analyzed the separation of ownership and control from a managerial 
perspective. In Blair & StoutÕs analysis, there is little or no emphasis on the distinctive role of 
managers. Managers barely figure in this account, appearing, like employees, merely as 
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functional or Òbona fideÓ team members (Lan and Heracleous, 2010). This contrasts with what 
we know from management science, which highlights the profound, transformative effects of 
management on employees, as they are guided to develop the capabilities necessary to achieve 
the enterpriseÕs goals (Conner and Prahalad, 1996; Eisenstat et al., 2008).  
It is therefore worth trying to reappraise the separation of ownership and control, drawing 
on a view from management. The rise of managerial authority is often associated with the 
emergence, at the end of the nineteenth century, of mass production (Hounshell, 1984), the 
increasing size and administrative complexity of industrial organizations, and intensive capital 
requirements. Another factor, however, was also important: the increased pace of technological 
and scientific progress, and the rise of a science-based industry. In a few decades, innovation 
radically changed the nature, forms and purpose of corporations, and provided strong new 
rationales for separating ownership and control.  
In this next section, we examine the role of science and innovation in the emergence of the 
management function, as a broad phenomenon that affected most Western countries. 
 
The rationale for separating management and directorship: the role of innovation  
The Òmanagerial revolutionÓ has been defined in many different ways, but it became 
observable when managers, as a new social and professional group, obtained great influence 
through strategic leadership and considerable hierarchical authority over employees.  
The first manifestation is the transfer of control from directors to managers. It took place 
in the US and in France for instance at the end of the 19th century. It became progressively 
more critical as more salaried managers, without being shareowners, were appointed to run 
businesses. Owner families often kept control of their companies (via their control of the board), 
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but they progressively and massively recruited managers to run their companies or sent their 
sons to schools that would make them knowledgeable enough to do so themselves (Joly, 2013).  
The second manifestation of the managerial function is the recognition that employees 
were subordinated to employers within the enterprise. This was a drastic change, described in 
France as a Òcoup de force dogmatiqueÓ (Cottereau, 2002). The trend in the nineteenth century 
had been to conceptualize work relationships in contractual and commercial terms. Workers 
were more or less independent contractors or suppliers, with their own methods, and often their 
own tools. There were very few supervisory or managerial staff (Lefebvre, 1999). To the extent 
they existed, the role of hierarchies or intermediate managers was mainly to find and hire labor, 
and bargain over prices. The new employment contract had distinctive features: unlike self-
employment, it featured an an Òopen-ended duty of obedienceÓ for employees (Deakin, 2009), 
and was based on the recognition of managerial authority (Freeland, 2009).  
Building on business history, we can identify three main rationales to explain these shifts.  
 
Innovation-based economy: management as a new source of wealth 
The rise of science-based industry. The beginning of the twentieth century was marked 
by integration of science and industry (Le Chatelier, 1935; Fridenson, 1987). Innovations had 
been, until then, often left to individual inventors or entrepreneurs (e.g. Watt & Boulton in 
1795 in United Kingdom). As technologies became more complex, the development of new 
technologies required fundamental research (Noble, 1979; Lett, 2004). The need for scientific 
investigation became a pressing matter in a number of industries. From the chemical industry 
to telecommunications, via glass and electricity, US corporations developed industrial research 
laboratories from the end of the nineteenth century (Hounshell and Smith, 1988; Hughes, 1983). 
The number of American companies engaged in scientific research grew from 500 in 1921 to 
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1,000 in 1927, and exceeded 2,200 by 1940 (Reich, 1985). A new science-based industry was 
beginning to emerge, transforming enterprises from productive to innovative organizations.  
A new economic model.  With the rise of science-based industry, the economy moved 
from one based on traditional capital to one based on innovation: the value of the enterprise 
increasingly derived from the capacity to organize collective endeavours rather than from 
ownership of the means of production or access to finance. As a consequence, capital became 
Òpassive ownershipÓ and shareholders were simply suppliers of finance (Berle and Means, 
1932).  
Classical economic theory was based on production and consumption functions: it was 
unable to account for the production of research and the innovative power of modern 
companies (Rathenau, 1921; Segrestin, 2017). But in the modern innovation-based economy, 
the role of management was not only to reduce costs. It was more fundamentally to design 
previously unseen strategies and produce new goods and renew the means of production 
(Goyder, 1987; Rathenau, 1921; Segrestin and Hatchuel, 2011; Segrestin and Hatchuel, 2012).  
 
Managerial authority based on the development of new competencies  
Scientific management. The notion of Òscientific managementÓ which spread at the 
beginning of the twentieth century transformed labour management into a series of techniques 
(e.g., organizational control, executive recruitment and training, and incentive payments). Here 
again, the organization of work activity was not only due to the imperative of reducing costs. 
With the progress of mechanization, it became clear that the classical labor market did not work 
for more complex or innovative products. Workers were no longer able to produce the outputs 
with their existing know-how and tools. In innovative production regimes, the old rule-of-
thumb method of management by incentives and initiatives was a (highly conflictual) dead-
end. Management therefore had to organize the development of new working methods more 
scientifically.  In TaylorÕs (1911) view, the tasks of scientific management were to 1) Òdevelop 
a science for each element of a manÕs works, which replaces the old rule-of-thumb methodÕ 
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and 2) Òscientifically select and then train, teach, and develop the workman, whereas in the 
past he chose his own work and trained himself as best he couldÓ (Taylor, 1911). 
 
A new conception of labour. The scientific approach to the activity of labour resulted in 
profound changes to the employment relationships (Fridenson, 1987). Until then, workers had 
been independent and organized their work themselves. Labour had previously been seen as a 
commodity, with wages driven by the competitive market. Subsequently, their know-how was 
substituted by managerial prescriptions. The consequence was that workers no longer simply 
exchanged their labour for a salary. Instead, they saw their capabilities transformed as they 
were integrated into complex production systems. Taylorism is often denigrated as de-skilling 
workers, but management was first and foremost a function to renew and develop workersÕ 
capabilities. Progressive thinkers such as Commons (1919) grasped this shift from a theory of 
the man as a commodity to one where he was considered Òa mechanism of unknown 
possibilitiesÓ (Commons, 1919).  
 
A new field of expertise  
 A new field of expertise, that was not just technological but also social and human 
engineering, emerged. It required new skills and competencies to organize research activities 
and innovative processes. And the more science drove business organizations into the unknown, 
the bigger the demand was for radically new competencies to devise innovative but sustainable 
strategies. This, in turn, drove the new role of executives and the need for managerial discretion.  
Traditional accounting methods and schools, and traditional economics could not address 
the new industrial challenges. New curricula on administrative science were therefore 
introduced at universities. In the United States, following the creation of Wharton School of 
Business in 1881, Harvard launched its Master of Business Administration in 1908, and the 
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number of business schools grew rapidly (O'Connor, 2012; Hambrick and Ming-Jer, 2008; 
Khurana, 2007), Òa manifestation of the modern conception of businessÓ (Brandeis, 1914). 
 
New social responsibilities  
The rise of management overwhelmed traditional economic and industrial relationships 
but did not occur without frictions and conflicts. Globally, however, it was part of a progressive 
movement and the recognition by labour law of managerial authority implied increased 
responsibilities for managers. For instance, at the end of the nineteenth century, employment 
relationships meant the employer absorbing social risks. Legislation towards the end of the 
nineteenth century made employers responsible for workplace accidents (Commons, 1919; 
Saleilles, 1897). 
 More generally, the role of management was positively correlated with the public interest 
for two main reasons. 
First, the scientific rationalization of work was likely to both stimulate the production of 
useful goods (Rehfeldt, 1988; Fridenson, 1987) and increase wages, as well as potentially 
reducing working hours (Brandeis, 1914: 41). The promise of scientific progress was also 
enormous: electricity, automobiles, telecommunications, and polymers, for example, were 
expected to deliver great social utility. Managers often put forward their social responsibilities 
and the public or quasi-public services they were delivering as part of their businesses (Marens, 
2008). Perkins, for instance, considered managers as Òquasi-public servantsÓ (Perkins, 1908).  
The rise of management also played a political role as it was also likely to alleviate the 
social conflicts between capitalists and workers. Scientific managers played the role of a 
Òneutral technocracyÓ (Berle and Means, 1932), likely to calm relationships between owners 
and workers (Savino, 2009). This role had a broader purpose than the economic profit of the 
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company. Its aim was to develop workersÕ and organizational capabilities. Many authors and 
businessmen considered that the new managementÕs Òwider outlook and deeper sensitivenessÓ 
made possible the fulfilment of social functions for employees over and above the pursuit of 
productionÓ (Child, 1969). This clearly went with the responsibility to define a common 
purpose capable of mobilizing different stakeholders (Barnard, 1938). A number of texts from 
the period, across different disciplines, repeated the idea that managers were professionals, 
trustees, and impartial judges or arbitrators (cf. Perkins, 1908; Dodd, 1932; Brookings, 1925;  
see also Cambon, Le Chatelier or Amar, in France, quoted by Fridenson, 1987). Modern 
management therefore had wider social responsibility than directors had.  
 
THE RISE OF MANAGEMENT: THE SPECIFIC CASE OF THE UK  
It is clear that the development of management followed a different pattern in the UK than 
in the US, or in Germany or France. Different reasons have been put forward. Among them, 
we can quote the ownership structure and the related Òproprietorial theory of the firmÓ (Quail, 
2002), but also the noticeably different approach to engineering (Buchanan, 1989). It is beyond 
the scope of this paper to offer a detailed account of British business history, but it is important 
to note that recent historical works have traced the rise of management in the UK during this 
period.  
The influence and authority of management was important both at the head of business 
companies and upon employees.  
At the headquarters level, for instance, founding families maintained representatives on 
the board of directors for an exceptionally long time (Franks et al., 2005; Keeble, 1992; Wilson 
and Thomson, 2006). The handover of control of the business to professional managers, 
however, started in the 1870s (Wilson and Thomson, 2006). This was a slow process (Lewis et 
al., 2011), but accelerated from the 1930s, when the number of managers employed in British 
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businesses began to grow rapidly. By the middle of the twentieth century, professional 
managers were increasingly being appointed to boards (e.g. up to three quarters in the steel 
industry in 1947 (Erickson, 1986)). 
At the level of employees, in the United Kingdom, master and servant law was definitively 
abolished very late in 1875 (in France, this change came much earlier, with the Revolution at 
the end of the eighteenth century proscribing contracts that were not between juridical equals, 
like those of guilds). But the same Òconceptual shiftÓ (Deakin, 2009) from commercial 
relationship to employment contract was observable at the end of the 19th century. Similarly, 
the development of the management function was less dramatic than in the US, but it still 
increased importantly: the proportion of administrative, technical and clerical staff grew from 
8% of the workforce in 1907 to 15% in the mid 1930s and to 20% by 1948 (Whitston, 1995). 
 
Basically, the structure of ownership slowed down but did not prevent the rise of the managerial 
function, and there is evidence to indicate the three main drivers we identified above were 
relevant for UK too.  
- A new business model based on innovation  
The rise of management driven by science-based industry was also less visible in the UK: 
engineers, who elsewhere were a symbol of the integration of science and industry, followed a 
different ÒcraftÓ model in the UK (Smith, 1990; Smith and Meiksins, 1995). British engineers 
historically entered the engineering profession through apprenticeships.  This system 
emphasized the importance of engineering as a Òpractical craftÓ rather than a theoretical 
discipline, and connected technical workers to manual crafts. While in the late nineteenth 
century American universities were restructured to supply engineers to take up positions in the 
corporate hierarchies of large firms (Noble 1977), in Britain engineering courses were 
  
 
21 
restricted to a few institutions and did not in any way disrupt the apprenticeship systems 
(Seethamraju, 2004) 
However, different evidence can be put forward. As Whitston (1995, p56) puts it, ÒÉeven 
in Britain, business was being driven slowly, painfully and unevenly down the path already 
trodden in America.Ó  It was for instance the key purpose of the Institution of Mechanical 
Engineers, created in 1846, to bridge science and industry. Its purpose was Òto enable 
Mechanics and Engineers engaged in the different Manufactories, Railways, and other 
Establishments in the Kingdom to meet and correspond, and by mutual exchange of ideas 
respecting improvements in the various branches of Mechanical Science, to increase their 
knowledge and give an impulse to inventions likely to be useful to the worldÓ (Buchanan, 1989, 
p. 80). This occurred gradually, as demand for research in industry, while heterogeneous, grew 
at the end of the 19th century, especially in the industries that relied on new technologies.   
As a consequence, the education of engineers was also pushed progressively toward more 
scientific curricula. This move was certainly weak and late compared for instance to Germany, 
but after initial unsuccessful attempts in London at University College and KingÕs College, 
Glasgow and Manchester established more systemic and theoretical programmes for engineers 
(Buchanan, 1989). 
Finally, beyond engineers, many industrialists (as well as scientists, e.g. (Crookes, 1898)) 
recognized the critical role of science: ÒIt is chiefly in the manufacturerÕs appreciation of the 
scientific branches of his establishment, and of research work that the need lies. We require 
more employers with Captain CuttleÕs admiration of the man chock full of science.Ó (Burton, 
1899)a 
 
- New managerial competencies and curricula 
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Regarding the recognition of a distinct corpus of managerial competencies and the creation 
of new business schools, the UK was late too3. Yet, here again, there is strong evidence that 
managerial principles, methods and tools were passed to UK companies too. 
It is now acknowledged that, especially through the role of production engineers in new 
industries, the influence of the Taylorian movement was evident in the early 20th century. At 
the end of the nineteenth century, early labour management policies rejected the Òlaissez faireÓ 
doctrine and adopted the Òindustrial bettermentÓ principle to improve working conditions and 
standards of rewards (Child, 1966, p. 35). It was clear, at least in a few pioneering companies, 
that labour could be approached in a rational way and organized with limited effort for 
improved outcomes (Rowlinson, 1988). Industrialists such as Cadbury, Rowntree and Renold 
were both receptive to and critical of scientific management. They were reluctant to consider 
workers as Òliving toolsÓ, but were also convinced by the importance of developing new 
expertise to rationalize working processes and train workers.  
It is true that business schools were introduced very late in the UK Ð especially at 
Cambridge and Oxford (Arena and Dang, 2011) - but there were moves to institutionalize the 
new knowledge. For instance, between 1918 and 1921, the Industrial Welfare Society, the 
National Institute of Industrial Psychology and the Institute of Industrial Administration were 
founded.  
There were also considerable efforts to conceptualize the new function of business 
administration. By 1914, management started to be formalized4. A whole body of literature 
emerged from practitioners (such as Burton, Renold, and Lee in the UK), who tried to 
synthesize their experience and careers as general managers. They also theorized the new role 
                                               
3 Charles Babbage was a pioneer and a notable exception when he called, as early as 1835, for a 
systematic and rational discussion of engineering (Babbage, 1835). 
4 See for instance: Edward Cadbury, Experiments in Industrial Organization, 1912; or Herbert N. 
Casson, Factory Efficiency, 1917). 
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of administration in modern companies, which went far beyond the roles of cost reduction or 
monitoring that had been conceptualized by economists. All these authors felt that management 
required methods and doctrines which departed fundamentally from classical accounting, 
engineering and political economy. 
- Extended social responsibilities  
Finally, there is also a range of evidence as to the progressive role and extended 
responsibilities of business men associated with the new managerial ethos. For instance, as 
managers started to organize the work of employees, the law made employersliable for 
industrial accidents: the Workmen's Compensation Act 1897 in the United Kingdom 
introduced liability a year before France. Whilst obviously not all managers followed this 
approach (see e.g. Quail 2002), a Ôpublic serviceÕ mandate was claimed by many industrialists 
in the United Kingdom, including W. L. Hichens (chairman of Cammell), Lord Leverhulme 
and Seebohm Rowntree, who claimed they regarded industry as a national service. 
Management was identified as the agent of technological change and a vital force for human 
progress.  
As Whitston puts it, ÒScientific management was a ÔprogressiveÕ movementÓ. In the UK, 
he explains, the advocates of scientific management Òdenounced the conservatism of employers as 
well as workers. They attacked the lump of labour fallacy but also demanded high wages for 
productive work; criticised laissez faire and lauded planning. They offered a vision of social and 
industrial peace based on worker and employer co-operation in generating a surplus big enough to 
have no need to argue about its distribution. Scientific managers were more likely than others to 
welcome new ideas about human relations because they were seen, by Taylor's successors, as an 
extension of the science of managementÓ (Whitston 1995, p.156).  
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In summary, despite significant differences in the timing and institutionalization compared 
with the US, the rise of modern management was broad-based and significant in the UK.  
 
MANAGEMENT AS A BLIND SPOT FOR COMPANY LAW AND ITS 
REFORMERS: THE UK CASE 
The reception of the rise of management in law: an ambiguous turn  
How did the law respond to rise of management? In labour law, a power to manage was 
recognized. The status of managers was not, however, clarified because formally the employer 
is the company, and not the manager. Managers are basically viewed as representing the 
employer (Davies and Freedland, 2006). To grasp managersÕ status, we therefore need to look 
at company law.  
As a separation between directors and managers began to develop in practice, this was 
belatedly recognized by the law, which had always by default allowed directors to delegate 
their management function to one or more of their number (Art 68 Table A 1862). From 1908, 
the law allowed directors to appoint a managing director or a manager Òfor such term, and at 
such remuneration (whether by way of salary, or commission, or participation in profits, or 
partly in one way, and partly in another), as they may think fitÉÓ (Art 72 Table A 1908).  
The effect was that managers below board level were treated as representatives of the 
employer by labour law, but simply viewed as employees from the perspective of company 
law. This meant that they could be dismissed and could be restrained from divulging trade 
secrets, but were not subject to fiduciary duties and had no other special status.  
ÒA sharp line was drawn between the directors (seen as partial owners representative of 
the owners as a whole) and managers (seen as employees). Firms were viewed as sets of 
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operations carried out by employees but initiated and supervised by directors in a manner 
analogous to the separate roles of politicians and civil servants.Ó (Quail, 2002). 
The role of managing director is therefore a strange hybrid. The managing director also 
had to be a director, to maintain a connection between the board and the management. As the 
practice evolved of directors appointing one or more of their number as managing directors to 
act as the head of management, the courts had to identify the legal implications of appointing 
a managing director. They recognized the validity of these contractual arrangements, and took 
the view that a managing director is both a manager and a director. However, beyond stating 
that the role was Òof a managerial and not of a subordinate characterÓ, the law did not prescribe 
the functions of the managing director, which were determined by the contract between the 
director and the company.5 A company law textbook of 1920 explained that ÒThe duties of the 
managing director are to attend to the commercial part of the business of the company, and not 
to things which concern the company itself but not its businessÓ (Stiebel, 1920, p.43). There 
was a separation between the management function, which could be delegated by the board, 
and the control function, which could not. In effect, in law, the management function was a 
residual category, consisting of all those functions which the directors were allowed to delegate.  
Hence, boards could not delegate to managers in such a way that they would be free from 
board supervision. In one case,6 the company, acting through the two governing directors 
named in the articles, had appointed the plaintiff as sole manager of its confectionery 
department with full power to conduct the business of the department without interference from 
the directors except as regards expenditure of capital on new branches, erection of buildings 
and machinery and conduct of legal matters. The court ruled that the agreement was outside 
the power of the company (that is, it was an infringement of the articles), and therefore the 
                                               
 
5
 Per Lord Reid in Harold Holdsworth & Co (Wakefield) Ltd v Caddies [1955] 1 All ER 725 at 738.  
6 Horn v Henry Faulder & Co (1908) 99 LT 524.  
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plaintiff could not rely on it to prevent interference. Power to manage the business had been 
delegated by the company to the two governing directors under its articles, and the company 
therefore had no power to appoint someone who would have a share in the management 
Òindependently of the control of the governing directorsÓ. Where management was delegated 
to a general manager, the courts took the view that the scope of permissible delegation was 
determined by the articles. This meant that Òthe only duties which [the board] could delegate 
to the general manager are those which belong to the management of the ordinary commercial 
business of such a companyÓ.7  
The historical emergence of management was therefore accommodated within existing legal 
structures, rather than supported by a specific legal regime. Managers were viewed as 
employees and were never given any special authority. As a result, managersÕ innovative 
function, distinct competencies and social responsibilities were neither defined nor protected 
by law. Instead, the lawÕs focus was restricted to the relationship between directors, 
shareholders and the corporate entity. As we will see in the next section, this legal 
ambivalence opened the door for these developments to be reversed following World War II.  
The absence of management in company law and corporate governance reforms 
We now review more thoroughly the main changes to company law and corporate 
governance after World War II that affected the status of management in the United Kingdom. 
We do not purport to offer a comprehensive account of company law reforms, but to show how 
particular changes overlooked the issue of managerial authority and left the door open to 
principles of corporate governance that weakened the management function, giving non-
executive directors and shareholders greater influence over strategy. More precisely, our 
analysis shows that the absence of a clear managerial status allowed reforms that reversed the 
                                               
7
 County Palatine Loan and Discount Company. CartmellÕs Case (1874) L.R. 9 Ch.A 691. 
  
 
27 
managerial ÒrevolutionÓ (Fourcade and Khurana, 2013; Styhre, 2015) outlined in the previous 
sections. These reforms basically 1) reduced managerial authority and restored ownership as 
the source of legitimate power; 2) suppressed the reference to special competencies to run 
companies; and 3) alleviated the reference to social responsibility and the role of businesses in 
society and the collective interest. 
The 1948 Company Law Reforms Ð the way back to ownership-based economy? A 
Company Law Amendment Committee, known as the Cohen Committee, was appointed in 
1943 and reported in 1945. This review took place against a background of recognition of the 
growing separation of ownership and control, concerns about the quality and reliability of 
company accounts, and a wider debate about the role of companies in society (Clift, 1999; 
Bircher, 1988). The Committee was given the mandate Òto consider and report what major 
amendments are desirable in the Companies Act, 1929, and, in particular, to review the 
requirements prescribed in regard to the formation and affairs of companies and the safeguards 
afforded for investors and for the public interestÓ.8 With key members considering shareholders 
as ÒproprietorsÓ and Òthose on whom the first loss fallsÓ,9 the Committee focused its attention 
almost exclusively on strengthening the position of shareholders in relation to directors. There 
was no discussion during the reported proceedings of the Committee about the emergent role 
of management during the first half of the twentieth century.  
After reviewing the evidence on the growing separation of ownership and control, the 
Committee concluded that it was Òdesirable to give shareholders greater powers to remove 
directorsÓ.10 To make it easier for shareholders to exercise control over the directors, the 
Committee recommended a number of changes, including the introduction of mandatory 
                                               
8 Cohen, Report, 7 
9 HMSO, Minutes, paras 1743, 3682 and 10205 
10 Cohen, Report, para 130 
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minimum notice periods for general meetings to make it easier for shareholders to attend, 
facilitating shareholder resolutions and making it harder for directors to solicit proxies. The 
most important change, however, was the CommitteeÕs recommendation that Òany director (É) 
should be removable by an ordinary resolution, without prejudice to any contractual right for 
compensationÓ (Cohen Committee, para 130). This mandatory power was only briefly 
discussed by the Committee during its meetings at a late stage in the process, but was 
introduced in section 148 of the Companies Act 1948 and overrode the provisions in the articles 
relating to the removal of directors, which, by default, required a 75% majority of shareholders.  
The importance of this change was almost entirely overlooked by commentators, both at 
the time (see for example Dodd, 1945; Kahn̺Freund, 1946) and in the years that followed 
(Wedderburn, 1965). Introduced by section 148 of the Companies Act 1948, this rule, however, 
fundamentally changed the balance of power within companies. In particular, it allowed hostile 
takeovers to emerge as a means of dislodging managers. Before 1948, hostile takeovers were 
virtually unheard of, but the first wave struck the UK in 1952. Section 148 opened up many 
companies to takeover, because incumbent directors knew that even if a bidder only acquired 
majority control of the general meeting, it could remove them from the board, leaving them 
locked in as minority shareholders (for an example of this in 1953, see Bull and Vice, 1961). 
In essence, it amounted to a statutory ÒbreakthroughÓ rule that allowed any shareholder who 
acquired a majority of the shares to take control of the composition of the board, leaving the 
board and the management vulnerable to change at short notice (Johnston, Segrestin and 
Hatchuel, 2019).   
This rule was introduced with no regard to the separation of directors and management 
that occurred during the first half of the twentieth century. It represented a return to the view 
that the wealth of a company is the result of its ownership and capital provision, rather than the 
collective innovation processes organized by management. It relied on reductive assumptions 
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about shareholders as owners, and sought to make directors accountable to shareholders, 
entirely ignoring the new role of managers as technocrats or stewards of the enterprise, with 
real discretion (Veldman and Willmott, 2016). 
Non-executive directors Ð a transfer of control back from managers to directors. A 
second fundamental change began during the 1970s, as policy-makers began to call for greater 
numbers of non-executive directors (NEDs) on boards. There had always been NEDs on the 
boards of listed companies, as a way of reassuring shareholders, but they were widely 
disparaged as Òguinea pigsÓ (Samuel, 1933). Their rehabilitation as a means of Òcountering the 
vicious practice of having the board controlled or dominated by the managersÓ began in the 
United States in the 1930s (Douglas, 1934). In the 1940s, the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) began to recommend that publicly-held companies should have audit 
committees consisting of Ònon-officer board membersÓ as a Òmeans of strengthening auditor 
independenceÓ (Earle, 1979). The SEC became more active during the 1970s, with successive 
chairmen arguing for more outside directors, until in March 1977 the New York Stock 
Exchange imposed a listing requirement that companies should have audit committees 
composed at least predominantly of outside directors. This requirement took effect from June 
1978 (Sommer, 1977). 
As the takeover boom of the 1960s faded, these US developments influenced the United 
Kingdom. In 1973, the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) published a report entitled ÒA 
New Look at the Responsibilities of the British CompanyÓ, with the support of the Governor 
of the Bank of England. The report concluded that Òinclusion on the board of non-executive 
directors was highly desirableÓ. The CBI was strongly opposed to the introduction of two-tier 
boards with employee representation, which had been proposed by the European Economic 
Community in its Fifth Company Law Directive. This recommendation sought to head off that 
threat by increasing the monitoring role of the one-tier board. The government supported an 
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expanded role for NEDs, but declined to legislate. However, the CBIÕs recommendations had 
considerable influence, and ultimately acted as a starting point for the work of the Cadbury 
Committee. From 1978, the Bank of England began to push for more NEDs, culminating in the 
establishment in 1982 of an agency for the Promotion of Non-Executive Directors (known as 
PRO NED) (Bank of England 1983), chaired by Sir Adrian Cadbury from 1984, before the 
Cadbury Report formalized these developments in 1992. 
These efforts bore fruit. In 1976, boards in the United Kingdom still tended to be 
dominated by management, with around 25% of the largest 1000 companies having no NEDs, 
and the majority having between one and five. These NEDs were rarely in a majority on the 
board, with larger companies tending to have boards of ten or more directors, but few having 
more than five NEDs (Bullock, 1977; 1978). By 1979, however, the Bank of England estimated 
that 88% of the largest 1000 companies had at least one NED, while 53% had three or more, 
with higher numbers in the largest companies (Bank of England 1979). By 1988, 75% of 
directors were independent, in that they had no previous or present relationship with the 
company (Bank of England 1988). 
The rise of NEDs therefore reversed the earlier transfer of control from directors to 
executive managers. In practice, the growing number of NEDs had significant implications for 
management. We have little evidence on the information on which NEDs base their decisions 
(see for example the Higgs Report 2003), but their control over management is largely based 
on financial metrics (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990). The role of management and its related 
competencies were never recognized, so, like the 1948 law reforms, this soft law reform pushed 
corporate governance back to the pre-managerial period.  
 
Institutional investor engagement: from common purpose back to private control. One 
last change is worth mentioning to show how the rationale behind the distinction of 
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management was eclipsed in the second half of the twentieth century. The rise of institutional 
shareholder engagement and, later, activism, was strongly encouraged by policy makers, with 
little regard to the need to separate ownership and control in modern businesses.  
From the mid-1950s onwards, institutional investors began to increase their shareholdings, 
so that by 1963, they owned 21% of listed company shares (King and Fullerton, 2010). Their 
shareholdings continued to increase steadily, from 37.8% of listed companiesÕ shares in 1969 
to 58.9% in 1985 (Cosh et al., 1989). Policy makers saw engagement by these new institutional 
investors as a complement or alternative to the market in ensuring that shareholders could hold 
management to account. In 1972, against the backdrop of a downturn in the takeover market, 
the Bank of England set up a working party to discuss the creation of a Òcentral organisation 
through which institutional investors, in collaboration with those concerned, would stimulate 
action to improve efficiency in industrial and commercial companies where this is judged 
necessaryÓ (Bank of England Annual Report 1972 at 25-6). The result was the establishment 
of the Institutional ShareholdersÕ Committee (ISC), supported by the Bank of England. The 
Bank of England was alarmed by the fact that the law had made shareholders Òtechnically 
supremeÓ, but that they had Òall but abdicatedÓ, deciding only on the success or failure of 
takeover bids (Charkham, 1989). New efforts were therefore made by the ISC to address the 
perceived problem of communication failures between institutional shareholders and corporate 
managers. In 1991, the ISC issued a statement on the ÒResponsibilities of Institutional 
Shareholders in the UKÓ, and the 1992 Cadbury Report on the Financial Aspects of Corporate 
Governance endorsed this, encouraging Òregular systematic contact at senior executive level to 
exchange views and information on strategy, performance, board membership and quality of 
managementÓ (Cadbury, 1992). It also noted the importance of shareholders exercising their 
voting rights, and paying particular attention to questions of board structure, the primary 
concern of CadburyÕs report. Institutional investor activism became a progressively more 
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important part of corporate governance policy, culminating in the adoption of the Stewardship 
Code after the 2008 financial crisis, which built on the activities of the ISC and termed 
institutional investors ÒstewardsÓ, a function which Cadbury had originally assigned to the 
directors (who, following his recommendations, would mainly be NEDs).11 
This phase of corporate governance policy represents another sidelining of managerial 
discretion, with institutional investors now having authority to offer views on strategy directly 
to NEDs, over the heads of managers. The separation of ownership and control allowed 
managers to take into account the interests of various stakeholders. As we outlined in the first 
part, historically, managersÕ role and responsibility was critical for employees who had begun 
to bear risks as their capabilities were transformed by the innovative industrial regime. These 
social responsibilities of managers, however, were not explicitly recognized by law, making 
them vulnerable to reforms that reduced managerial discretion. These changes in corporate 
governance allowed institutional investors to have significant influence on strategy, without 
bearing responsibilities to employees, society or the environment.  
 
 
CONCLUSION AND FURTHER RESEARCH: TOWARDS A NEW STATUS FOR 
MANAGERS? 
In this article, we have contrasted the historical rise of professional managers with the 
lawÕs silence on their function. Focusing on the increased role of science and technological 
innovation in business, we have highlighted how the rise of a distinctive management function 
provided some important reasons for separating ownership and control. We identified three 
basic rationales: the shift of the source of wealth from ownership to management, the need for 
                                               
11 Cadbury, Report, paras 2.5, 5.1, 6.1 and 6.6 
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specific skill-sets, and the rise of new social responsibilities. Corporate law clearly 
distinguished between directors and shareholders, but managers remained either employees 
(with no autonomy) or directors. Progressively, reformÑoverlooking the historical emergence 
of and justifications for managementÑgave back control to shareholders and limited the scope 
of managerial discretion. 
Taken together, these changes were crucial because they meant that the overall mission of 
management to develop new capabilities and organize innovation processes has progressively 
become secondary to the purpose of maximizing shareholder value. More and more authors, 
however, now consider that innovative strategies are essential to long term value creation, to 
support balanced stakeholder management and to drive sustainable economic development.  
Our analysis therefore adds to the body of research on the separation of ownership and 
control by shedding new light on the historical status of managers. It also suggests that the law 
has overlooked fundamental changes in business organizations. The law has been primarily 
concerned with the relationship between board and shareholders and has almost entirely 
ignored the position of managers. A legal conceptualization of the function of management 
could have provided alternative foundations for a separation of ownership and control. Our 
article also opens new avenues for research. If we consider, as many authors do, that managerial 
discretion is a key condition for both collective innovation and stakeholder management, could 
the law integrate a conceptualization of management? Throughout the twentieth century, many 
proposals for reforms of corporate governance were suggested, including alternative business 
forms (such as cooperatives and hybrid organizations), broadening fiduciary duties (Orts, 1992), 
broadening participation by allowing groups other than shareholders to appoint, influence or 
sit on the board (Asher et al., 2005), changes to takeover regulation, and enterprise contracts 
(see (Wells, 2002) for a review). More recently, it has been suggested that it may be helpful to 
extend fiduciary duties to controlling shareholders, who have considerable influence on 
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management decisions (Anabtawi and Stout, 2008). Would such reforms resolve the confusion 
between management, directors and controlling shareholders, however?  
In our view, very few proposals really aim to recognize the role of management in law. 
Our analysis therefore calls for further research to make the distinctive role of management 
more visible in law. The historical basis for management may inform new ideas for reform, 
and a better conceptualization of management in law might fuel new laws about enterprises. 
We believe that the law should recognize the role of management in ensuring companiesÕ 
ongoing survival and prosperity.  
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